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We study the phenomenon of business ecosystems in which platform firms orchestrate the functioning of
ecosystems by providing platforms and setting the rules for participation by complementor firms. We develop
a theoretical framework to explain how the structural and evolutionary features of the ecosystem may shape
the extent to which participating complementor firms can sustain their superior performance. The structural
feature, which we refer to as ecosystem complexity, is a function of the number of unique components or
subsystems that interact with the complementor’s product. We incorporate the evolutionary features by
considering the role of generational transitions initiated by platform firms over time as well as the role of
complementors’ ecosystem-specific experience. Evidence from Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android
smartphone ecosystems supports our arguments that higher ecosystem complexity helps app developers
sustain their superior performance, and that this effect is stronger for more experienced firms. In contrast,
platform transitions initiated by Apple and Google make it more difficult for app developers to sustain their
performance superiority, and that this effect is exacerbated by the extent of ecosystem complexity. The study
offers a novel account of how the performance of complementor firms in platform-based business ecosystems
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ABSTRACT 
We study the phenomenon of business ecosystems in which a platform firm orchestrates the functioning 
of the ecosystem by providing a platform and setting the rules for other complementor firms to participate 
in it.  We develop a theoretical framework to explain how the structural and evolutionary features of the 
ecosystem may shape the extent to which participating complementor firms can sustain their superior 
performance.  The structural feature, which we refer to as ecosystem complexity, is a function of the 
number of unique components or subsystems that interact with the complementor’s product.  We 
incorporate the evolutionary features by considering the role of generational transitions initiated by 
platform firms over time as well as the role of complementors’ ecosystem-specific experience.  Evidence 
from Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android smartphone ecosystems supports our arguments that higher 
ecosystem complexity helps app developers sustain their superior performance, and that this effect is 
stronger for more experienced firms.  In contrast, platform transitions initiated by Apple and Google 
make it more difficult for app developers to sustain their performance superiority, and that this effect is 
exacerbated by the extent of ecosystem complexity.  The study offers a novel perspective on how the 
performance of complementor firms in business ecosystems may be shaped by the rules and actions of the 
central platform firms. 
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Introduction 
There is increasing recognition within the strategy field that the locus of value creation has 
shifted from focal firms to business ecosystems (Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Teece, 2007; Baldwin, 2012; 
Adner et al., 2013).  Business ecosystems encompass different types of firms offering complementary 
products and who are connected through an underlying technical architecture.  Often, such contexts are 
characterized by a firm that orchestrates the functioning of the ecosystem by providing a platform and 
setting the rules for other complementor firms to participate in it.  Scholars exploring this phenomenon 
have tended to focus on the strategies and performance of platform firms (e.g., Gawer and Henderson, 
2007; McIntyre and Subramaniam, 2009; Eisenmann et al., 2011; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012).  Much less 
attention has been devoted to understanding the performance of the complementor firms who are critical 
to the value creation within the ecosystem.    
In this study, we focus on the performance of complementor firms within an ecosystem.  
Specifically, we study the extent to which a high performing complementor can sustain its superior 
performance within an ecosystem.  While sustainability of superior performance is a critical goal for 
managers and has been an important line of inquiry for strategy scholars (e.g., Porter, 1985; Rumelt et al., 
1991), it is becoming increasingly difficult for firms to realize it (Wiggins and Ruefli, 2002; D’Aveni et 
al., 2010; McGrath, 2013).  In the context of business ecosystems, sustainability of complementors’ 
superior performance has important implications not only for the complementors but also for the platform 
firms whose performance is tied to that of their complementors.   
To unpack the drivers of sustainability, we first consider the structure of the complementor’s 
interdependence with other actors in the ecosystem.  We characterize this structural feature based on the 
number of unique components or subsystems that interact with the complementor’s product.  For 
example, in the iOS smartphone ecosystem orchestrated by Apple (the platform firm), an application 
software (app) developer firm (the complementor) is interdependent on the specific handset and operating 
system combination offered by Apple.  In contrast, in the Android smartphone ecosystem orchestrated by 
Google, an app developer is interdependent on many unique handset and operating system combinations 
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offered by firms such as HTC, LG, Motorola and Samsung.  We use the notion of ecosystem complexity 
to characterize this difference in the structure of interdependence for complementor firms.  We then 
consider the role of generational transitions initiated by platform firms over time (e.g., introduction of 
new generation of operating system) as well as the role of complementors’ ecosystem-specific experience.   
Drawing on the evolutionary economics perspective (e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982, 2002; 
Gavetti and Levinthal, 2004), we theorize performance dynamics among complementor firms to be 
shaped by firms searching for superior performance configurations as well as imitating the strategic 
configurations of higher performing firms (Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000; Zott, 2003; Lenox et al., 2006).  
We argue that greater ecosystem complexity makes it much more difficult for follower firms to search for 
configurations that yield superior performance and to imitate the configurations of the leader firms.  
Hence, complementor firms will find it easier to sustain their success when ecosystem complexity is high 
than when it is low.   
We also argue that while experience in an ecosystem in general facilitates learning, generational 
transitions initiated by the platform firms typically requires complementors to reconfigure their products 
and may reduce the value of their accumulated learning.  As a result, complementors’ ability to sustain 
their superior performance will be facilitated by their experience and will be hampered by platform 
transitions.  Finally, we consider how these effects are impacted by ecosystem complexity.  We argue that 
higher ecosystem complexity will be associated with greater learning opportunities, and therefore, the 
benefit of experience will be greater when ecosystem complexity is high than when it is low.  In contrast, 
during platform transitions, higher ecosystem complexity would make it more difficult for complementors 
to reconfigure and sustain their superior performance.  Hence, the negative effect of such transitions on 
the sustainability of complementors’ superior performance will be stronger when ecosystem complexity is 
high than when it is low. 
We test our arguments on app developers that participate in Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android 
smartphone ecosystems within the U.S. market.  The context provides a valuable opportunity to study 
complementors’ performance dynamics in ecosystems with varying levels of complexity and subject to 
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frequent platform transitions.  The diversity in handsets and operating systems among the user base makes 
the Android ecosystem much more complex for app developers than the iOS ecosystem.  While the 
contrast between iOS and Android is stark, we also observe varying levels of complexity within the 
Android ecosystem over time.  In addition, we observe three episodes of platform transitions that entail 
major updates to the handset and the smartphone operating system.1   
We assembled a unique panel dataset of top-performing app developers in the iOS and Android 
smartphone ecosystems over the two-year period from January 2012 to January 2014.  To gain insights 
into the challenges of developing apps and competing in the iOS and the Android ecosystems, we also 
interviewed several executives and engineers from app developer firms.  The analysis is based on the 
extent to which app developers sustain their superior performance by observing whether their apps 
continue to be in the top performance stratum in a given ecosystem (i.e., Top 500 apps by revenue).  The 
research setting is hypercompetitive and, on average, a firm sustains its superior performance for only six 
months.  Moreover, once a firm exits the top performance stratum in a given ecosystem, the likelihood of 
reappearance in the stratum is very low.  Only 14% of exit events are followed by re-entry in the top 
performance stratum.  Finally, 64% of top-performing firms participate in both the iOS and Android 
ecosystems, which helps us address endogeneity concerns due to firms self-selecting into a given 
ecosystem. 
We find that higher ecosystem complexity increases app developers’ likelihood of sustaining their 
performance superiority.  However, generational transitions initiated by platform firms impede app 
developers’ ability to sustain their superior performance, and that this effect is exacerbated by the extent 
of ecosystem complexity.  Finally, we find that experience within an ecosystem helps app developers 
sustain their superior performance, and that this beneficial effect is more pronounced at higher levels of 
complexity.  
                                                          
1 While smartphone is the dominant hardware for Android and iOS operating systems, these operating systems are 
also used in other hardware categories such as tablets and e-readers.  In this study, we focus on the performance 
dynamics of app developer firms within only the Android and iOS smartphone ecosystems.   
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The study, while limited to a specific empirical context, offers one of the first detailed accounts of 
the drivers of complementors’ performance within an ecosystem.  A key aspect of the study is to 
characterize the structure of interdependence for complementor firms in terms of ecosystem complexity 
and show that this characterization helps explain the drivers of value appropriation among firms.  We also 
illustrate how platform transitions and complementors’ ecosystem experience impact the ease with which 
complementors can sustain their performance advantage, and how these effects vary at different levels of 
ecosystem complexity.  In so doing, the study contributes to the emerging literature stream examining the 
challenges and opportunities faced by complementor firms in business ecosystems (e.g., Boudreau, 2010; 
Kapoor, 2013; Kapoor and Lee, 2013).  By linking ecosystem-level complexity with firm-level search 
processes, the study is also among the first to offer systematic empirical evidence on one of the key tenet 
(i.e., the role of complexity on firm performance) within the evolutionary economics perspective of firms 
(e.g., Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000;  Lenox et al., 2010).  Finally, our findings contribute to the literature 
on the persistence of superior firm performance (e.g., Wiggins and Ruefli, 2002, 2005; D’Aveni et al., 
2010) by highlighting how the specific features of the business ecosystem can impact sustainability of 
superior performance among complementor firms.   
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
There is growing recognition within the strategy field that firms are operating in the context of 
business ecosystems in which value is created through a network of firms offering complementary 
products and services.  Often, business ecosystems are orchestrated by firms such as Apple, Cisco, 
Google, Intel, Microsoft, and SAP, which provide the central technological platform and set the rules for 
how complementor firms participate in it (e.g., Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Iansiti and Levien, 2004).  
Scholars studying this phenomenon have explored how platform firms compete and manage their 
interdependence with complementors (e.g., Schilling, 2002; Gawer and Henderson, 2007; Boudreau, 
2010; Eisenmann et al., 2011; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012).  The emphasis has been on explaining how firms 
can create a platform, attract users and complementors, and achieve market dominance.  Hence, the 
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research so far has tended to focus on the strategies and performance of the unitary actor that orchestrates 
the business ecosystem.  Much less attention has been devoted to understanding the performance 
consequences for complementors who typically represent a vast majority of firms in the ecosystem and 
who are critical to the total value created by the ecosystem.  
In this study, we focus on the performance of complementor firms.  In particular, we consider the 
problem of sustaining superior performance, and we explore the extent to which a high performing 
complementor can sustain its performance advantage within an ecosystem. Sustainability of superior 
performance is an important goal for managers (e.g., Porter, 1985), and it has been studied extensively by 
strategy scholars (e.g., Rumelt et al., 1991; Teece, 2007).   However, recent empirical evidence suggests 
that it is becoming increasingly difficult for firms to sustain their superior performance (Wiggins and 
Ruefli, 2002; 2005; McGrath, 2013).  For example, drawing on a comprehensive database of 40 industries 
from 1974 to 1997, Wiggins and Ruefli (2005) found that periods of persistent superior performance 
among firms have decreased over time.  They found that this pattern is not only limited to high-
technology or manufacturing industries but is also prevalent across a broad range of industries.  
Moreover, several scholars have underscored in general a lack of understanding of the reasons why the 
persistence of superior performance varies across different types of firms and industry environments 
(McGahan and Porter, 1997; Hoopes et al., 2003; D’Aveni et al., 2010).  We theorize how 
complementor’s sustainability of superior performance is impacted by two key features of the ecosystem.  
First, we consider the structure of complementor’s interdependence with other actors in the 
ecosystem based on the number of unique components and subsystems that interact with a 
complementor’s product.  We refer to this structural feature as ecosystem complexity.  The greater the 
number of unique components and subsystems that interact with a complementor’s product, the greater is 
the degree of ecosystem complexity faced by the complementor.  Hence, depending on the architecture of 
the ecosystem, the same complementor may be subject to varying degrees of complexity across two 
different ecosystems (e.g., an app developer in iOS and Android smartphone ecosystems), or two different 
complementors may be subject to varying degrees of complexity within the same ecosystem (e.g., an app 
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developer and a handset manufacturer within the Android smartphone ecosystem). 2  Figure 1 illustrates 
our approach of considering varying levels of ecosystem complexity faced by a complementor through a 
simple schema.   
 (Insert Figure 1 about here) 
 
Second, we consider the evolutionary shifts in the ecosystem as a result of generational 
transitions initiated by platform firms (e.g., new generations of gaming consoles introduced by Sony, 
Nintendo, or Microsoft).  These transitions represent a common means by which platform firms compete 
and create value over time.  From a complementor’s perspective, however, they necessitate significant 
adaptation, as complementors reconfigure their products to leverage the performance improvements 
accorded by the new generation of the platform. 
We derive predictions regarding how structural complexity and platform transitions within an 
ecosystem impact a complementor’s ability to sustain its superior performance.  Given the importance of 
experience in shaping firms’ performance outcomes across different types of industry environments 
(Dutton and Thomas, 1984; Balasubramanian and Lieberman, 2010), we also consider the effect of 
complementor’s ecosystem experience across varying degrees of ecosystem complexity.   
Our theoretical predictions stem from the evolutionary economics perspective of firms (e.g., 
Nelson and Winter, 1982, 2002; Levinthal, 1997; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2004).  Drawing on this 
perspective, we consider the dual search processes of innovation and imitation as shaping performance 
dynamics among firms (e.g., Zott, 2003; Lenox et al., 2006).  The first process, innovative search, is 
characterized by firms searching for superior solutions to a given problem and improving their 
performance over time (e.g., Levinthal, 1997).  The second process, imitative search, represents firms’ 
                                                          
2 Since our emphasis in this paper is to explore the performance outcomes of complementor firms, we are 
considering the local structural complexity that the complementor firm is subjected to in a given ecosystem. A 
separate characterization can entail the complexity of the entire ecosystem.  Note also, as these examples illustrate, 
ecosystem complexity that a given complementor is subjected to could be driven by the number of actors producing 
variants of the same component.  It could also be driven by the underlying technical architecture such that a given 
complement may vary in the number of components that it interacts with.  Our empirical context presents a nice 
setting in which ecosystem complexity is driven by the former while controlling for the latter.  
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attempting to imitate other high performing firms (e.g., Rivkin, 2000).  We assume that complementor 
firms are continuously searching for superior performance configurations within an ecosystem.  While 
search processes for complementors with inferior performance (follower firms) are more likely to be 
characterized by some combination of innovative and imitative search, the search processes for 
complementor firms with superior performance (leader firms) are more likely to be characterized by 
innovative search.  We first explore the role of ecosystem complexity in impacting complementors’ 
ability to sustain superior performance.  We then examine the role of complementors’ experience and 
platform transitions and how they interact with ecosystem complexity. 
 
Ecosystem Complexity 
To explain how ecosystem complexity influences complementor firms’ sustainability of superior 
performance, we need to understand how ecosystem complexity impacts the search processes of firms in 
the ecosystem.  As ecosystem complexity increases, complementors need to optimize their products so as 
to account for greater interdependence between their products and other components or subsystems within 
the ecosystem.  For example, in our empirical context, the large variety of the handset and operating 
system combinations subjected app developers to significantly greater complexity in the Android 
ecosystem than in the iOS ecosystem.  During our interviews, many executives and engineers from app 
developer firms emphasized this difference.  The quote below from an engineer elucidates the difference: 
“We need to test our app on different OEM devices likes Samsung, HTC to make sure our app 
works on different Android devices.3 This creates a lot of work for developer and testing teams.  
iOS does not have any such issue…this is our biggest technological challenge with Android.” 
From a theoretical perspective, greater ecosystem complexity subjects complementors to 
numerous interrelated design choices and decision variables (i.e., creates high level of interdependence).  
Under these conditions, the search for superior performance configuration by follower firms is difficult 
(e.g., Levinthal, 1997).  This is because a high level of interdependence increases the number of possible 
                                                          
3 OEM stands for Original Equipment Manufacturer.  In our empirical context, it is used to refer to handset 
manufacturers. 
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combinations of decisions, which makes the search process intractable.  Moreover, even if a follower firm 
is able to innovate and identify a higher performance configuration, it is more likely that the configuration 
represents a local optimum and may not lead to superior performance.  Further, greater complexity also 
makes it difficult for follower firms to search by incrementally changing their decision variables.  In 
enhancing the performance of one variable, managers often inadvertently undermine the performance of 
other variables.  
Beyond searching for superior configurations through innovation, followers can also imitate 
leader firms.  When ecosystem complexity is high, the focal firm with the leadership position is also 
protected against imitation in two ways.  First, follower firms will find it difficult to decipher the exact 
configuration of the leader firm (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Rivkin, 2000).  Second, even if a follower 
attempts to replicate the exact configuration of the leader, greater complexity will help sustain the leader’s 
superior performance.  This is because a small error in imitation will generate large penalties in 
performance when there is a high level of interdependence among design choices (Rivkin, 2000). 
Finally, the leader firm can also sustain its performance by continuously searching for superior 
performing configurations.  However, such a search process is prone to errors, and the firm can 
unknowingly end up in a lower performance configuration (Harrison and March, 1984, Knudsen & 
Levinthal, 2007).  The high level of interdependence among design choices can help leader firms avoid 
such errors.  Under such conditions, configurations that lead to superior performance tend to be less 
correlated (Levinthal, 1997).  A small change in a given configuration can lead to substantially different 
performance outcomes.  This reduces the likelihood of leader firms selecting an inferior alternative 
(Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007).  As a result, a focal complementor that is subject to a high level of 
ecosystem complexity and that has already achieved superior performance is less likely to erroneously 
move towards a lower performance configuration.  
In summary, ecosystem complexity acts as a buffer for complementors with superior performance 
by making it more difficult for other complementors to search for or imitate higher performance 
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configurations and by reducing the likelihood of leaders’ search processes erroneously moving them 
toward lower performance configurations.  Accordingly, we predict: 
Hypothesis 1: A complementor firm will be more likely to sustain its superior 
performance when ecosystem complexity is high than when it is low. 
 
Ecosystem Experience 
A complementor firm’s experience within an ecosystem can also play a significant role in its 
ability to sustain superior performance.  Experience within an ecosystem will help confer several types of 
learning-based advantages on leader firms.  Experience facilitates the development and improvement of 
routines, making search more reliable (i.e., less prone to mistakes) (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Katila and 
Ahuja, 2002).  Experience also helps improve the efficiency of leader firms’ search processes by reducing 
the cost of experimentation and, hence, making it less costly for firms to innovate over time (Zott, 2003).   
In addition to the abovementioned learning-by-doing advantages, an important type of learning-
based advantage in business ecosystems is what Rosenberg (1982) referred to as learning-by-using.  This 
type of learning-based advantage is not a function of the experience in developing and producing the 
product per se, but rather of the experience in the product’s utilization by its users.  Rosenberg (1982) 
provided a detailed account of learning-by-using in the aircraft engine industry and conjectured that this 
type of learning is especially important in systemic industries such as electric power generation, 
telephones, and computers, where the use of the product is influenced by its interaction with other 
components and subsystems.  In such industry contexts, it is very difficult for firms to know in advance 
how the product will perform during use and, hence, user experience plays a vital role in helping firms 
innovate and improve their products over time.   
In our interviews, a senior engineer from an app developer firm elaborated on the importance of 
experience-based benefits through both learning-by-doing and learning-by-using: 
"Experience plays a critical part in our product lifecycle. From pure engineering 
perspective…most of the knowledge and skills are acquired through the development efforts over 
time. It is not easily accessible from outside-firm sources, and it [is] essential for building a high 
quality, user delightful application…The application keeps evolving at design and feature level, 
11 
through responding to user feedbacks and data. Engineering team also benefits from this mostly 
capturing edge cases which is rarely producible in the internal environment.” 
Finally, experience in an ecosystem enables leader firms to accumulate knowledge-based assets.  
Follower firms imitating such assets will be subject to time compression diseconomies (Dierickx and 
Cool, 1989), making it easier for the leader firms to sustain their performance superiority.  Hence, 
experience in an ecosystem is likely to confer a high performing complementor with both learning-by-
doing and learning-by-using advantages as well as make it more difficult for followers to replicate its 
knowledge-based assets.  Accordingly, we predict: 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the complementor’s ecosystem experience, the more likely the 
complementor will sustain its superior performance within the ecosystem. 
 
We next explore the extent to which a complementor firm’s experiential advantage within an 
ecosystem is impacted by the level of ecosystem complexity.  Greater complexity among design choices 
is associated with steeper learning curve that makes it more difficult for followers to catch up with 
experienced leaders (Balasubramanian and Lieberman, 2010).  In addition, the greater the degree of 
ecosystem complexity that a focal firm’s product is subjected to, the more uncertain will be the 
interactions between the product and the rest of the system and, hence, the more valuable will be learning-
by-using.  Finally, time compression diseconomies associated with the followers’ imitation of assets 
accumulated by the leader firms are also likely to increase in ecosystem complexity (Pacheco-de-
Almeida, 2010).  Hence, we expect that complementors’ ecosystem experience would be more valuable in 
sustaining their superior performance when ecosystem complexity is high than when it is low: 
Hypothesis 3: The positive effect of a complementor’s ecosystem experience on the 
sustainability of its superior performance will be stronger when ecosystem complexity is 
high than when it is low. 
 
Generational Transitions by Platform Firms 
Finally, we consider the impact of generational transitions initiated by platform firms on the 
complementors’ ability to sustain their superior performance.  Transitioning to a new platform generation 
is an important mode by which platform firms compete and create value.  New platform generations 
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typically offer improvements in existing functionality and also add new functionality.  In so doing, they 
alter the interactions among components and subsystems within the ecosystem (Venkatraman and Lee, 
2004; Ansari and Garud, 2009; Adner and Kapoor, 2010).  This renders the strategic configurations of the 
high performing complementor firms from the previous platform generation less effective.  Put at a more 
abstract level, the fitness landscape (i.e., mapping between strategic configurations and performance) is 
re-specified (Levinthal, 1997).  For example, when Apple introduced the new mobile operating system 
named iOS 6, some of the music apps stopped working.  After updating to the new operating system, 
many users found that their music data had disappeared.  Application developers had to optimize and 
retest their apps with the new operating system to ensure smooth functioning of their apps.  During our 
interview, a senior engineer from an app developer firm also elaborated on this challenge: 
“Although OS upgrades do a good job of the issue of backward compatibility, but the new OS 
will depreciate some APIs from the older version.4 If the apps are using the API from the older 
version, it is going to crash. Further, we also try to use latest APIs in the new OS. If the user tries 
to run the latest APIs on the older version, the app is going to crash.” 
 
In another interview, a cofounder of a leading app developer firm discussed how a recent 
transition in iOS impacted the functioning of his firm’s app: 
“In iOS 7 [released in September 2013], Apple changed some parts of the background 
infrastructure [API] the way an app interacts with the operating system, in order to 
enhance the graphics on its new hardware.  And because of this change, our app literally 
stopped working on the new version, when it was working perfectly in the previous 
version.” 
 
Hence, while platform transitions are important for sustaining technological progress within an 
ecosystem, they may present challenges for complementors to sustain their superior performance:  
Hypothesis 4: Generational transition initiated by the platform firm will make it more 
difficult for the complementor firm to sustain its superior performance within the 
ecosystem. 
 
In the face of a platform transition, complementors need to adapt so as to identify new strategic 
configurations that can yield high performance.  We now consider how ecosystem complexity affects 
                                                          
4 API stands for application program interface.  In the context of smartphone ecosystems, these are software 
protocols provided by platform firms such as Apple and Google for app developers to create apps for their 
platforms. 
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these firms’ ability to adapt — i.e., we explore the interaction between platform transitions and ecosystem 
complexity.  When ecosystem complexity is low (i.e., products offered by complementors are subject to 
fewer technological interactions within the ecosystem), adaptation through local search performed in the 
neighborhood of a firm’s previous configuration is effective (Levinthal, 1997).  Hence, a complementor 
with a superior performance configuration in the previous platform generation will find it relatively easier 
to identify a high performance configuration in the new platform generation.  In contrast, when ecosystem 
complexity is high, adaptation through local search is not very effective.  Successful adaptation would 
require a greater degree of change (i.e., often referred to as a long jump on a fitness landscape).  However, 
at the same time, a high degree of interdependence among firms’ choices makes such a large-scale change 
very risky, as a small error or miscalculation can result in subpar performance (Henderson and Clark, 
1990).  Therefore, we predict:   
Hypothesis 5: The negative effect of platform transition on the sustainability of a 
complementor’s superior performance will be stronger when ecosystem complexity is 
high than when it is low. 
 
Methodology 
We explore our arguments in the context of the iOS and Android smartphone ecosystems within 
the U.S. market.  The focal complementor firms are application software developers who were able to 
attain superior performance in these ecosystems from January 2012 to January 2014.  Smartphones based 
on iOS and Android operating systems represent more than 90% of the U.S. smartphone installed base 
during the study period.  Both Apple and Google provide a daily list of Top 500 apps by revenue.  We use 
that information to identify the focal firms.  The context is hypercompetitive, where hundreds of 
thousands of app developers are frequently introducing new apps or improved versions of their existing 
apps.  Such high intensity of competition makes it very difficult for app developers to sustain their 
superior performance, even for a few months. 
This setting also provides a natural experiment in which we can observe two ecosystems with 
varying levels of complexity for the app developers within the same industrial context.  This difference 
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arises primarily due to the difference in the strategies used by Apple and Google for controlling and 
governing their respective ecosystems.  Apple’s strategy is often described as a closed strategy, as it 
exercises strong control over the entire ecosystem, with the objective of providing high quality experience 
to the user (Ghazawneh and Henfidsson, 2013).  Most notable is Apple’s strict control and ownership of 
both the handset and the iOS operating system.  In contrast, Google’s strategy is premised on Android as 
an open-source operating system, which allows its development and distribution by various original 
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) such as HTC, LG, and Samsung.  This has resulted in the Android 
ecosystem being more fragmented.  Hence, an app in the Android ecosystem interacts with multiple 
specialized handset and operating system combinations offered by various OEMs.  As a result, an app 
developer firm in the Android ecosystem operates in a relatively more complex ecosystem compared to 
the one operating in the iOS ecosystem.  The two ecosystems also collectively underwent three episodes 
of platform transitions during our observation period, which allowed us to examine the impact of platform 
transition on complementors. 
 
Data 
The primary sources for our data are App Annie (www.appannie.com) and appFigures 
(www.appfigures.com), two of the leading analyst firms in the mobile computing sector.  App Annie has 
been tracking and archiving information related to all the applications developed on iOS and Android 
platforms since 2009.  Its data is extensively used by app developers, venture capital firms, and financial 
analysts.  Similarly, appFigures has developed a comprehensive database of all apps in the iOS and 
Android ecosystems since 2009.  We used appFigures as a supplementary data source in order to validate 
the data received from App Annie and to also extend the data to incorporate a more recent time frame.5  
Note that both App Annie and appFigures do not generate their own data, but accumulate daily data from 
Google Play and Apple iTunes over time and offer their users easy-to-use tools for analyzing trends. 
                                                          
5 Originally, App Annie was the primary source of data for the paper.  We had received data from App Annie from 
January 2012 to June 2013.  We subsequently received data from appFigures that allowed us to extend the timeline 
to January 2014.     
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The dataset comprises information on app developers whose apps attained top-ranking positions 
by revenue (i.e., Top 500) in either the iOS or Android ecosystem from January 2012 to January 2014.  
The revenue distribution for smartphone apps is heavily skewed.  For example, based on a recent survey 
of more than 10,000 app developers, it was found that the top “1.6% of developers make multiples of the 
other 98.4% combined” (VisionMobile, 2014).6  Therefore, having an app in the Top 500 list offers clear 
evidence of performance superiority among hundreds of thousands of app developers.  Such a list is also 
keenly followed by industry observers and analysts as a reference for successful app developers. 
The majority of firms whose apps appear in the Top 500 list do not stay in that list for more than 
six months, a finding that is consistent with the context being hypercompetitive.  Unpacking such finer-
grained performance dynamics requires choosing an observation window that is shorter than the annual 
window typically employed in strategy research (D’Aveni et al., 2010).  We chose the period of 
observation to be a given month that would allow us to explain greater variance in the app developer’s 
sustainability of superior performance without being subject to exogenous intermittent fluctuations in the 
Top 500 ranking associated with daily or weekly observations.  This required aggregating the daily 
revenue rank data obtained from App Annie and appFigures into monthly data.  Because of the skewness 
of the distribution of revenues across the Top 500 apps, taking a simple average of apps’ daily ranks to 
compute monthly ranks is problematic.  To adjust for this skewness, we followed a procedure guided by 
prior research.   
Researchers have attempted to infer revenue and sales data from rank data by conducting 
experiments, collaborating with focal firms, or using publicly available information (e.g., Brynjolfsson, 
Hu, and Simester, 2003; Chevalier and Goolsbee, 2003; Garg and Telang, 2013).  These studies have 
found that the relationship between revenue (or sales) and rank closely follows a Pareto distribution 
according to which: 
𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 = 𝑏 ∗ (𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘)−𝑎+ ∈ 
 
                                                          
6 The report is available at http://www.developereconomics.com/reports/developer-economics-q3-2014/. 
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where b is the scale parameter that is a function of the total revenue and a is the shape parameter 
of the underlying distribution that drives the difference in revenues across ranks.  Moreover, the shape 
parameter for the Pareto distribution has been found to be proximate to 1.  For example, in a recent study 
by Garg and Telang (2013), shape parameters for the iOS and Android apps were estimated to be between 
0.86 and 1.16.  Hence, to account for the Pareto distribution in our data, we assume the daily revenue for 
an app in the Top 500 list to be inversely proportional to its rank.7  Further, we assume the scale 
parameter for each ecosystem to be constant during a given month.  This allows us to calculate an app’s 
monthly revenue rank for both the iOS and the Android ecosystems.  
In addition to data on app developers whose apps achieved a Top 500 rank by revenue, we also 
obtained monthly data on the total number of apps and firms within each category of apps (e.g., games, 
social networking, productivity).  We supplemented data from App Annie and appFigures with data from 
firms’ websites and LinkedIn (www.linkedin.com) to gather information on the number of employees and 
firms’ participation in businesses other than smartphone apps.  We contacted some firms that had missing 
data via e-mail.  To measure ecosystem complexity faced by app developers within the Android 
ecosystem, we obtained data on the monthly share of the U.S. installed base for each of the smartphone 
OEMs from comScore (www.comscore.com). The final dataset comprises 12,720 monthly observations 
from 1,533 app developer firms. 
 
Measures 
Dependent variable: We examine the sustainability of superior performance for app developers 
by observing whether their apps continue to be among the Top 500 apps by revenue in the iOS or Android 
ecosystem.  For about 80% of the cases, a firm had a single app in the Top 500 list in the same month.  
Since our level of analysis is a firm and not an app, if a firm had more than one app in the Top 500 list, 
                                                          
7 Note that the inversely proportional relationship between app revenue and rank also follows from Zipf’s law that is 
frequently used to approximate actual data from rank data in physical and social sciences.  
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we treated those cases as a single firm-level observation.8  Similar to Wiggins and Ruefli (2002, 2005) 
and Hermelo and Vassolo (2010), we consider a firm’s superior performance to be eroded if it exits the 
superior performance stratum (i.e., the Top 500 list).  In order to ensure that the exit is somewhat 
persistent rather than intermittent, we use a window of three months to record the exit event (i.e., firm’s 
app is not present in the Top 500 list for three consecutive months after being in that list in the previous 
month).  Hence, a firm is assumed to sustain its superior performance if its app continues to be in the Top 
500 list in at least one of the following three months.  We also performed sensitivity checks by using 
windows of two and four months.  
On average, an app developer firm remains in the Top 500 list for a longer duration in the 
Android ecosystem (7 months) than in the iOS ecosystem (5 months).  Moreover, in the iOS ecosystem, 
about half of the firms exit the Top 500 list in less than two months, whereas in the Android ecosystem, 
this duration is about five months.  This pattern is consistent with our prediction in Hypothesis 1. 
 
Independent variables:  Complexity has been defined and measured in many different ways 
across different scientific fields (Lloyd, 2001).  This is because no single approach can capture what 
scientists from different fields mean by complex (Page, 2010).   In general, most definitions and 
associated measures consider complexity based on the difficulty of describing or creating an object, or 
based on the degree of organization with respect to the object (e.g., structural linkages between parts of a 
system).  Our measure of ecosystem complexity needs to account for the structural interdependencies that 
an app developer is subjected to within a smartphone ecosystem.  Therefore, our approach here is 
consistent with characterizing complexity in terms of the degree of organization.  It is also consistent with 
the formal theoretical literature in strategy using NK models (i.e., N elements and K interactions) that we 
extensively draw upon in our theorizing.   In the context of business ecosystem, the greater the diversity 
of components and subsystems that a complementor is interdependent on, the greater is the ecosystem 
                                                          
8 In such cases, we used the higher ranking app to create app-level control variables. 
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complexity.9  For smartphone ecosystem, the most obvious interdependencies for an app developer are 
with respect to the operating system and the handset.  Hence, the greater the diversity of operating system 
and handset configurations that an app developer is subjected to, the greater is the ecosystem complexity.  
As Apple controls both the operating system and handset, an app developer in the iOS ecosystem interacts 
only with the unitary configuration.  In the case of the Android ecosystem, although the core operating 
system is designed by Google, each smartphone OEM customizes the operating system and the handset.  
As a result, an app developer in the Android ecosystem interacts with handset and operating system 
configurations from many different OEMs.  We use a Simpson index-based measure to characterize this 
diversity in the operating system and handset configurations faced by the app developer (Page, 2010).10  
The measure ecosystem complexity is the sum of the squares of the monthly shares of the U.S. installed 
base for smartphone OEMs in an ecosystem.11  The measure takes a value of 1 for the iOS ecosystem and 
ranges from 0.28 to 0.40 for the more complex Android ecosystem.  We multiplied the measure by -1 so 
that higher values indicate higher ecosystem complexity.    
We measured ecosystem experience as the total number of months that a firm gained experience 
in a given ecosystem.  To obtain this measure, we first identified the month in which the firm introduced 
                                                          
9 Note that greater diversity in components or subsystems is not a sufficient condition for greater complexity, rather 
greater diversity coupled with interdependencies among components results in greater complexity.  This is also 
consistent with the dictionary definition of complex  – “composed of many interconnected parts” 
(http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/complex). 
10 An alternative could be a measure based on the Shannon index. The two indices differ with respect to the relative 
weights that they ascribe to each OEM’s user base. The Simpson index uses the proportion of each OEM’s installed 
base as weights to calculate the weighted arithmetic mean of the share of installed base for each OEM. The Simpson 
index thus gives higher weights to the OEMs which have high installed base. In contrast, the Shannon index uses 
weights based on natural logarithm of the proportion of installed base of each OEM and thus ascribes relatively 
higher weights to the OEMs with the low installed base. Hence, the measure is somewhat inconsistent with the fact 
that app developers focus most of their efforts on OEMs with high installed base.  The Simpson index measure is 
also mathematically identical to the popular Herfindahl index used in economics and management literature to 
measure industry concentration based on the sales of different firms within an industry. 
11 Note also that our measure is based on the share of OEMs installed base and not the share of their sales. This is 
because the market for apps is not only confined to new smartphones being sold but it also encompasses existing 
smartphones being used.  As an additional alternative measure, we could have also used a count-based measure of 
the number of Smartphone OEMs or the number of the different types of smartphones in a given ecosystem.  
However, in our interviews, industry participants repeatedly asserted that their firms focus their app development 
efforts on the small subset of more commonly used handsets.  For example, in Android, they consistently referred to 
focusing their efforts on 6-8 leading smartphones from multiple OEM firms.  The Simpson index-based measure 
helps to account for this concentration effect. 
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its first app in the ecosystem (i.e., month of entry) and then computed the number of months between the 
observation month and the month of entry.   
We identified the effect of platform transition using a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a 
new generation of smartphone operating system was introduced within the prior three months.  The 
reason for the three-month window is that it often takes users several weeks to adopt the new generation 
of operating system and a similar time frame for app developers to adapt and reconfigure their apps.  
During the period of study, there were two major platform transitions in the iOS ecosystem (launch of 
iOS 6 in September 2012 and launch of iOS 7 in September 2013) and one major transition in the 
Android ecosystem (launch of the Jellybean 4.1 operating system in July 2012).  Although Google 
officially launched Jellybean 4.1 in July 2012, it became available to the majority of U.S. consumers 
through the different OEMs only in December 2012.  We verified this information by searching for news 
articles discussing the launch of Jellybean 4.1 by OEMs such as Samsung, HTC, and Motorola, often with 
new generations of handsets.  Hence, for the Android ecosystem, we considered the period of platform 
transition to last from January to March 2013.  
To ensure that our coding of these platform transitions matches with our theoretical premise of 
challenges faced by complementors during such episodes, we used data from Google Trends for searches 
made on Google in the U.S. with the search term “app not working.”12  Figure 2 plots the normalized 
weekly trend of search volume from January 2012 to January 2014.   It shows clear instances of peaks 
during the months in which new generations of operating system are introduced within the iOS and 
Android ecosystems.  Hence, these trends confirm our coding schema and provide evidence of the 
challenges faced by app developers during periods of platform transitions.  
(Insert Figure 2 about here) 
 
Control variables: We controlled for a number of covariates that may influence an app 
developer’s ability to sustain its superior performance.  We used the total number of employees as a proxy 
                                                          
12 Results can include searches containing "app" and "not working" in any order. Other related terms may be 
included in the search results, like "music app not working." 
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for firm size and used this variable to control for scale-related effects.  Data on the total number of 
employees was collected from the firm’s website or LinkedIn.  For those firms for which this information 
was not available, we contacted them via e-mail and received a 78% response rate.   
About 64% of firms in the sample participated in both the iOS and Android ecosystems.  
Participation in both ecosystems may create challenges with respect to resource allocation over time.  We 
controlled for this effect through the variable dual participation, which takes a value of 1 if the firm had 
an app in both the iOS and Android ecosystems in a given month and 0 otherwise.  We also controlled for 
the firm’s presence in businesses other than smartphone apps.  The variable other online business takes a 
value of 1 if a firm participated in other web-based businesses like an e-commerce or a social networking 
website.  The variable other offline business takes a value of 1 if the firm’s scope of businesses expanded 
beyond the internet domain, such as game consoles, brick and mortar retail, etc.   
App developers often try to gain visibility by providing free apps.  We controlled for this effect 
through a dummy variable Top 500 free ranking that takes a value of 1 if any of the apps developed by 
the firm were also part of the Top 500 ranking based on the number of downloads for free apps in a given 
month.  We also controlled for the overall quality of firms’ apps by using data on consumer ratings 
received by all apps developed by the firm until March, 2014.  We are unable to observe the change in 
ratings for all apps over time.  Hence, we used a time-invariant firm-level control to capture firm-level 
differences in app quality.  Consumers can rate an app from 1 to 5 stars, with 5 being the highest 
quality.  The variable firm app rating is the average rating of all apps developed by the firm as of March, 
2014.  We also controlled for the price of the focal app that is in the Top 500 list (by revenue).  For the 
few firms that had more than one app in the Top 500 list in the same month, we used the price for the app 
with the higher rank.  
Firms predominantly offered apps in a specific category such as games, music, social networking 
or productivity.  We controlled for this category-level heterogeneity through category fixed effects and 
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other category-level time-varying controls.13  A firm can continue to have its apps in the Top 500 ranking 
if there is a high level of demand for a particular category of apps in which the firm is active in.  We 
account for this possibility using the variable apps in top 500, which is the total number of apps from the 
focal firm’s app category in the Top 500 list in a given month.  While the context in general is 
hypercompetitive, there may be differences in the competitive intensity across categories over time.  We 
included two variables to account for these differences.  First, we included the total number of new apps 
that were introduced in a category in a given month.  This variable captures apps launched by both new 
and existing firms.  Second, we included the total number of new firms that entered the category in a 
given month.  The two variables are log-transformed to account for skewness. 
  
Analysis 
We tested our hypotheses using discrete time event history analysis to estimate the rate at which 
app developers exit the superior performance stratum.  This approach is consistent with prior studies 
which have focused on studying the sustainability of firms’ superior performance (e.g., Wiggins & Ruefli, 
2002, 2005; Hermelo & Vassolo, 2010).  Many firms in our sample did not exit the superior performance 
stratum during the observation period.  Hence, our data is right censored.  Event history models are well 
suited to account for right-censored observations (Allison, 1984).  Since we are studying only those firms 
that made it to the Top 500 ranking and were subjected to the risk of exiting the superior performance 
stratum, our data does not have left censoring.  Some firms in our sample entered the superior 
performance stratum before the start of the observation period.  Hence, our data is left truncated.  We 
checked for potential biases due to left truncation through additional robustness checks.  We did this by 
including observations only for firms whose apps entered the Top 500 list after January 2012 or for firms 
that participated in the iOS or Android ecosystems from January 2012 onward, regardless of when their 
apps made it to the Top 500 list.  We report these analyses in the robustness checks section. 
                                                          
13 In the few cases where firms offered apps in multiple categories, we used information for the highest ranking app 
to calculate values for the category-level control variables.  
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We constructed data in the long form to account for time-varying covariates.  We used the Cox 
proportional hazards model, a robust technique for hazard rate analysis that does not require making an 
additional assumption about the shape of the baseline hazard, which may be increasing, decreasing, 
constant, or non-monotonous (Cox, 1975).  This helps address concerns with respect to incorrect 
distributional assumptions yielding biased estimates (Blossfeld and Rohwer, 2002), and the choice of 
parametric specification based on observed data generating inconsistent results (Carroll and Hannan, 
2000).  Further, we tested for proportionality hazard assumption by checking if the slope of the regression 
equation of scaled Schoenfeld residuals on time is nonzero for full model as well as for all predictor 
variables (Grambsch and Therneau, 1994). We found that the proportionality hazard assumption was not 
satisfied for Top 500 free ranking and price variables.  To overcome this issue, we followed the 
recommended approach in the literature by including interaction terms between time (in months) and the 
respective variables to allow for different effects of these variables at different points in time.  As a 
robustness check, we also performed our estimations using the piecewise constant model with month-
specific effects.  The estimates from these models were consistent with those obtained from the Cox 
model. 
 
Results 
We report the summary statistics and correlations between our covariates in Table 1.  We report 
the results from the Cox model in Table 2.  The model estimates the hazard rate that a firm exits the 
superior performance stratum and, hence, its inability to sustain its superior performance.  The reported 
coefficients can be exponentiated to obtain hazard ratios, which are interpreted as the multiplier of the 
baseline hazard of the firm exiting the superior performance stratum when the variable increases by one 
unit (Allison, 2001).  An increase in hazard can also be interpreted as shortening the time period for 
which a firm sustains its superior performance.  All standard errors reported were corrected for non-
interdependence across multiple observations faced by the same firm by clustering observations for each 
firm.  Model 1 is a baseline model.  In Models 2, 3, and 4, we include ecosystem complexity, ecosystem 
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experience, and platform transition to test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4, respectively.  In Model 5, we include 
the interaction term between ecosystem complexity and ecosystem experience to test Hypothesis 3.  In 
Model 6, we include the interaction term between ecosystem complexity and platform transition to test 
Hypothesis 5.  Model 7 is the fully specified model. 
 
(Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here) 
 
In Hypothesis 1, we predicted that higher ecosystem complexity will be associated with greater 
likelihood of complementor firms sustaining their superior performance.  This prediction was supported 
in all of the models (Models 2, 5, 6, 7).  The coefficient for ecosystem complexity is negative and 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.01).  Hence, higher ecosystem complexity is associated with lower 
likelihood of app developer exiting from the superior performance stratum.  In considering the magnitude 
of estimated coefficient in Model 2, we find that an increase in ecosystem complexity by one standard 
deviation reduces the app developer’s likelihood of exiting the superior performance stratum by 19%.  
In Hypothesis 2, we predicted that firms with greater experience within the ecosystem will be 
more likely to sustain their superior performance. We find support for Hypothesis 2, as the coefficient for 
ecosystem experience is negative and statistically significant in Models 3, 5, and 7 (p-value < 0.01).  
Hence, higher ecosystem experience is associated with lower likelihood of an app developer exiting from 
the superior performance stratum.  In considering the magnitude of estimated coefficients, an increase in 
an app developer’s experience by one standard deviation (16 months) decreases its likelihood of exiting 
the superior performance stratum by 11%. 
In Hypothesis 4, we predicted that generational transitions initiated by platform firms will make it 
more difficult for complementors to sustain their superior performance.  We find support for this 
prediction as the coefficient for platform transition is positive and statistically significant in Models 4, 6, 
and 7 (p-value < 0.01).  In considering the magnitude of estimated coefficient in Model 4, we find that an 
app developer’s likelihood of exiting the superior performance stratum increases by about 38% during the 
platform transition.  
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In Hypothesis 3, we predicted that the effect of complementor’s ecosystem experience on the 
sustainability of its superior performance will be moderated by ecosystem complexity such that the effect 
will be stronger when ecosystem complexity is high than when it is low.  We find support for Hypothesis 
3, as the coefficient for the interaction term between ecosystem complexity and ecosystem experience is 
negative and statistically significant (p < 0.10) in both Models 5 and 7.  Therefore, the effect of ecosystem 
experience on lowering the likelihood of an app developer’s exit from the superior performance stratum is 
stronger when ecosystem complexity is high than when it is low.  Figure 3 illustrates this interaction 
effect by plotting the predicted hazard of an app developer’s exit as a function of ecosystem experience 
and ecosystem complexity based on the estimates in the fully specified model (Model 7) and holding all 
other variables at their mean values.  High and low ecosystem complexity refers to values of one standard 
deviation above and below the mean.  The interaction effect seems to be more pronounced at lower levels 
of experience.   
(Insert Figure 3 about here) 
 
Finally, the coefficient for the interaction term between ecosystem complexity and platform 
transition is positive and statistically significant in both Model 6 and Model 7 (p < 0.05).  Hence, we find 
support for Hypothesis 5 that platform transitions make it more difficult for complementors to sustain 
their superior performance when ecosystem complexity is high than when it is low.  This interaction 
effect can be clearly seen in Figure 3 with the slope of predicted hazard of exit being much steeper for the 
high level of ecosystem complexity.  
 
Robustness checks 
We conducted a number of additional checks to establish the robustness of our findings.  The 
results from the robustness checks are reported in Tables 3 and 4.  First, in our main results, we 
considered a firm to be in the superior performance stratum if its app appeared in the Top 500 list by 
revenue, and we used a three-month observation window to assess whether the firm sustains its superior 
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performance or not.  To ensure that our results are not sensitive to these choices, we used a higher 
performance threshold based on a firm’s app in the Top 250 list by revenue (Model 8), and we also used 
windows of two and four months (Models 9 and 10).  The coefficient estimates for all the three models 
continue to support our predictions.   
 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
Second, in order to account for firms self-selecting into the iOS or Android ecosystems, we 
estimated a model by including data for only those firms that participated in both ecosystems.  The 
coefficient estimates are reported in Model 11 and exhibit very similar patterns as our main results. The 
only exception was that the interaction term between ecosystem complexity and ecosystem experience is 
marginally insignificant (p-value = 0.115).  In order to ensure that the significant effect of app 
developers’ ecosystem experience is not simply an artifact of their general experience with apps, we 
performed a supplementary analysis on these firms that participated in both ecosystems.  We controlled 
for the app developers’ general experience – the total number of months that an app developer has been 
active in the smartphone app market for iOS and Android apps.  The results are reported in Model 12.  
While the coefficient for general experience is significant, the coefficient for ecosystem experience 
remains significant and is of the similar magnitude as in the main results.  Note also that the magnitude of 
the coefficient for ecosystem experience is more than twice as that of the coefficient for general 
experience.  Hence, this check helps to reinforce that complementor firms’ experiential benefit has a 
strong ecosystem-specific component. 
Some firms in our sample entered the superior performance stratum before the start of the 
observation period.  Hence, our data is left truncated.  We tested for any potential biases due to left 
truncation by only including observations for those firms whose apps appeared in the Top 500 list after 
January 2012 (Model 13).  Additionally, we ran a model (Model 14) by only including observations for 
those firms that entered these ecosystems from January 2012 onwards, regardless of when their apps 
made it to the Top 500 list.  The coefficient estimates are qualitatively similar as our main results with the 
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exception of the interaction term between ecosystem complexity and firm experience exhibiting similar 
magnitude and sign, but the estimates are not precise enough for statistical significance.  This is possibly 
due to the fact that these estimations are based on a smaller sample and that too of younger app developer 
firms. 
Another potential concern with the analysis could be that our measure for ecosystem complexity, 
based on the OEMs’ installed base, does not account for the diversity of handset configurations within 
OEMs.  For example, in the case of iOS ecosystem, the measure remains constant throughout the 
observation period and does not capture differences with respect to the types of phones, especially does 
with different screen sizes (e.g., iPhone 4s and 5).  For an app developer, screen size in addition to OEM 
operating system configuration can be an important driver of the variety of the handset and operating 
system combinations that their app interacts with.  While designing an app, the developer needs to 
carefully ensure that its app fits and works seamlessly across the different screen sizes of the different 
OEMs (Panzarino, 2012).  Hence, we explore the robustness of our results by including a finer-grained 
measure of ecosystem complexity based on the number of unique OEM firm and screen size 
combinations.   
Further, since the measure of ecosystem complexity is significantly correlated with the type of 
platform (i.e., iOS or Android), it might be capturing some unobserved differences with respect to 
platform firms’ strategies or user-characteristics across these platforms.  These differences may impact 
the relative ease with which app developer firms can sustain their superior performance in a given 
ecosystem, and may make some of our inferences problematic.  To address this possibility, we obtained 
detailed data on installed base of handsets and user characteristics from comScore.  comScore conducts a 
monthly survey of about twelve thousand U.S. smartphone users and collects data on their handset 
profiles, user demographics and the app usage patterns.  The survey data for each month is then adjusted 
to account for national demographics.  Due to cost constraints, we were able to obtain this data only for 
the period from Jan’ 2012 to May’ 2013.  
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We used the information on screen size and OEM type in the comScore survey dataset to 
calculate the finer-grained measure of ecosystem complexity.  The use of this measure also allows us to 
control for the focal platform.  The variable iOS takes the value of 1 if the app developer is participating 
in the iOS platform and 0 if it is participating in the Android platform.  We mean centered the ecosystem 
complexity measure to address multicollinearity with the iOS variable.  Finally, we also control for 
differences in app usage behavior for the two platforms as it can be an important driver of app developers’ 
ability to sustain its performance in the specific ecosystem.  The variable App download measures the 
percentage of users who download 5 or more apps in a given month in the focal platform.  In addition, we 
also control for the differences in age and gender as these two demographic characteristics can drive 
differences in user preferences for various apps.  The variables Female user and Age measure the 
percentage of female users and the percentage of users of age between 18 to 45 years, respectively, for the 
focal platform in a given month.  We report the results in Table 4.   
 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
 
Model 15 is used to test the direct effects of the predictor variables with the new measure of 
ecosystem complexity and with additional controls for user characteristics.  Model 16 includes the 
additional control for the focal platform.  The coefficient estimates for the direct effects of the predictor 
variables are significant and consistent with our predictions.  Models 17 and 18 also include the 
interaction terms.  The coefficients for the interaction term between ecosystem complexity and platform 
transition are consistent with our main results with the coefficient being statistically significant in Model 
17 but insignificant in Model 18 (p-value = 0.198).  The coefficients for the interaction term between 
ecosystem complexity and experience have the expected sign but the standard errors are not precise to 
offer any statistical significance.  This is likely because of fewer observations and limited time period for 
the observation window.  Overall, these additional analyses help to establish the robustness of our 
findings and give us greater confidence in our inferences.  
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Discussion 
In this study, we focus on the emergent phenomenon of business ecosystems in which value is 
created through a network of firms offering complementary products and services.  We explore how the 
structural and evolutionary features of the ecosystem shape the extent to which complementor firms can 
sustain their superior performance.  We use the notion of ecosystem complexity to characterize the 
structure of the complementors’ interdependence with other actors in the ecosystem.  We incorporate the 
evolutionary features of the ecosystem by considering the impact of platform-level transitions and firm-
level experience on the complementors’ ability to sustain their performance superiority.   
We test our arguments on app developers in Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android smartphone 
ecosystems from January 2012 to January 2014.  During the period of study, both of these ecosystems 
were populated by hundreds of thousands of app developers that offered a wide variety of specialized 
software applications to smartphone users.  The stark contrast between Apple’s “closed” model and 
Google’s “open” model, in addition to several episodes of platform transitions initiated by these firms, 
allowed us to examine how ecosystem complexity and platform transitions impacted the ease with which 
complementors such as app developers could sustain their superior performance within an ecosystem.  
Consistent with our arguments, we find that higher ecosystem complexity helps app developers sustain 
their superior performance and that this effect is stronger for more experienced firms.  In contrast, 
platform transitions make it more difficult for app developers to sustain their performance superiority, and 
this effect is exacerbated by the extent of ecosystem complexity.  
Our study's findings make important contributions to the emerging literature streams in strategy 
on business ecosystems, platforms, and persistence of superior performance.  Scholars studying business 
ecosystems have focused on the coordination and technological challenges with respect to complementors 
and the resulting implications for firms’ organizational choices and value creation (e.g., Iansiti and 
Levien, 2004; Adner and Kapoor, 2010, 2014; Kapoor and Lee, 2013; Kapoor, 2013).  Scholars studying 
platforms have focused on the strategies used by platform firms to attract complementors and to compete 
against rival platforms (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Gawer and Henderson, 2007; Boudreau, 2010; 
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Eisenmann et al.; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012).   While these literature streams have shifted the theoretical 
emphasis from industries and products to business ecosystems and platforms, the primary mode of inquiry 
is to illustrate how firms manage their interdependence with complementors so as to create and 
appropriate value.   
In this study, we focus on the other side of the phenomenon and illustrate how complementors’ 
value appropriation is shaped by the structural and evolutionary features of the business ecosystem.  Our 
findings have implications for both platform firms such as Apple and Google that set the rules and own 
the core technological platform and complementors such as app developers that follow the rules and 
leverage the technological platform.  We show how the choices made by the platform firms (e.g., Apple’s 
closed model and Google’s open model) may play a significant role in the ability of complementors to 
appropriate value over time.  In addition, while major technological changes within the platform are 
important for sustaining the progress of the business ecosystem over time, we show that these changes 
can disrupt members who are leaders within specific market niches.  At the same time, platform 
transitions provide opportunities for other complementors in the ecosystem to gain leadership.  Hence, we 
shed light on the challenges and the trade-offs that platform firms and complementors face in their quest 
for superior performance over time.  
The study is also among the first to provide systematic empirical evidence regarding the role of 
complexity on firm performance as theorized within the evolutionary economics perspective.  While 
scholars have drawn on a variety of theoretical approaches to model firms’ search processes and their 
performance outcomes at different levels of complexity (e.g., Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000; Siggelkow 
and Rivkin, 2005), empirical evidence regarding the role of complexity on firm performance has been 
somewhat lacking (Lenox et al. (2010) is an important exception). We show that complexity plays an 
important role in sustaining superior performance in business ecosystems, and its impact is especially 
strong for more experienced firms and during periods of platform transitions.  
Finally, our findings also offer important implications for the literature stream examining 
persistence of superior performance. There is growing evidence that it is becoming increasingly difficult 
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for firms to sustain their superior performance over time (Wiggins and Ruefli, 2002, 2005; D’Aveni et al., 
2010; McGrath, 2013).  However, the underlying drivers of this trend are not well understood, nor are the 
reasons why the persistence of superior performance varies across different types of firms and industry 
contexts (McGahan and Porter, 1997; Hoopes et al., 2003; D’Aveni et al., 2010).  We contribute to this 
literature stream by generating and validating some theoretical mechanisms regarding why firms’ ability 
to sustain their superior performance may be influenced by the structural and evolutionary features of the 
business ecosystems.  Knowledge of such relationships can help managers devise strategies (e.g., 
frequency and nature of competitive moves, resources reconfigurations) that exhibit a superior fit with 
their business environment (e.g., Young et al., 1996; Lee et al., 2010).  We also offer an empirical 
contribution to this literature stream and reaffirm the need to go beyond annual datasets that are typically 
used in the strategy literate to shorter temporal windows, such as months or quarters. We show that such 
finer-grained observational periods can be more useful in deciphering performance dynamics in high 
velocity environments than the more aggregated annual data.  
The findings and the inferences from the study are subject to a number of caveats that offer 
opportunities for future research.  First, they are limited to a single empirical setting, and their validity 
needs to be established across other contexts.  Second, our measure of superior performance based on the 
Top 500 list by revenue, although widely accepted as a proxy for competitive superiority in our empirical 
setting and consistent with the strategy literature, may not represent true economic performance for 
complementors.  Finally, our dataset is limited to only 25 months, and while we observe significant 
fluctuations within the competitive landscape over this relatively short period, we are unable to draw 
inferences over longer time frames. 
Despite these and other limitations, the study offers one of the first explorations of how business 
ecosystems influence performance dynamics among complementors.  By drawing on arguments from the 
evolutionary economics perspective and by linking ecosystem-level effects with firm-level search 
processes of innovation and imitation, we show how they explain the extent to which firms can 
appropriate value within an ecosystem over time.   
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Figure 1: Simple schema illustrating varying levels of ecosystem complexity for a 
complementor.  Each circular node represents a specific component or subsystem that 
interacts with the complementor’s product in an ecosystem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Normalized weekly trend of Web search in the U.S. on Google for the term “app 
not working.” (Data source: Google Trends; http://www.google.com/trends/) 
 
 
Figure 3: Graphical plots of the interaction effects  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Ecosystem 
complexity 
Ecosystem 
experience 
Platform 
transition 
New 
apps 
New 
firms 
Apps in 
Top 
500 
Firm 
size  
Other 
Online 
business 
Other 
Offline 
business 
App 
price 
Firm 
app 
rating 
Top 500 
free app 
Dual 
parti- 
cipation 
Ecosystem 
complexity -0.665 0.341 1.000 
            Ecosystem 
experience 22.343 16.063 -0.530 1.000 
           Platform 
transition 0.178 0.382 -0.142 0.128 1.000 
          
New apps 7.842 0.974 -0.137 0.065 0.108 1.000 
         
New firms 6.351 0.769 -0.034 -0.017 0.067 0.952 1.000 
        Apps in Top 
500 198.842 162.808 0.063 -0.086 0.051 0.764 0.714 1.000 
       Firm size 
(employees) 620.432 1790.673 -0.043 0.162 0.000 -0.055 -0.068 -0.066 1.000 
      Other online 
business 0.587 0.492 -0.029 0.095 0.013 -0.038 -0.044 -0.011 0.230 1.000 
     Other offline 
business 0.300 0.458 -0.032 0.118 0.007 -0.063 -0.092 -0.069 0.398 0.293 1.000 
    
App price 3.555 30.865 -0.042 0.028 0.000 -0.082 -0.092 -0.103 0.010 0.008 0.040 1.000 
   Firm app 
rating 4.008 0.489 0.248 -0.293 -0.025 0.167 0.162 0.220 -0.228 -0.139 -0.180 0.010 1.000 
  Top 500 free 
app 0.558 0.497 -0.173 0.155 0.009 0.115 0.123 0.133 0.075 0.027 -0.048 -0.101 0.012 1.000 
 Dual 
participation 0.625 0.484 0.124 0.030 0.007 0.121 0.141 0.196 0.150 0.203 0.174 -0.027 -0.044 0.076 1.000 
 
Correlations greater than 0.01 or smaller than -0.01 are significant at p <0.05, N= 12,720 
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Table 2: Cox proportional hazards estimates for firms exiting the superior performance stratum 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Ecosystem complexity  -0.634***   -0.572*** -0.682*** -0.630*** 
  (0.116)   (0.168) (0.124) (0.168) 
Ecosystem experience   -0.007***  -0.026***  -0.026*** 
   (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Platform transition    0.321***  0.727*** 0.793*** 
    (0.075)  (0.244) (0.249) 
Ecosystem complexity*Experience     -0.015*  -0.016** 
     (0.008)  (0.008) 
Ecosystem complexity* Transition      0.651** 0.762** 
      (0.297) (0.304) 
New apps 0.066 -0.397** 0.194 0.023 -0.287* -0.392** -0.279* 
 (0.146) (0.168) (0.145) (0.149) (0.168) (0.169) (0.169) 
New firms -0.171 0.206 -0.268 -0.111 0.161 0.201 0.150 
 (0.185) (0.206) (0.182) (0.188) (0.202) (0.207) (0.203) 
Apps in Top 500 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
(Apps in Top 500)2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size (employee) -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Other online business -0.207*** -0.214*** -0.201*** -0.207*** -0.210*** -0.213*** -0.209*** 
 (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064) 
Other offline business 0.105 0.121 0.102 0.107 0.124* 0.122 0.126* 
 (0.078) (0.076) (0.078) (0.077) (0.075) (0.076) (0.075) 
Dual participation -0.430*** -0.389*** -0.422*** -0.424*** -0.366*** -0.389*** -0.366*** 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064) 
Firm app rating -0.085 -0.020 -0.128** -0.078 -0.071 -0.019 -0.069 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.057) (0.055) 
Top 500 free app -0.666*** -0.793*** -0.601*** -0.672*** -0.710*** -0.797*** -0.716*** 
 (0.094) (0.098) (0.095) (0.094) (0.097) (0.098) (0.097) 
Top 500 free app*time 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
App price 0.040 0.009 0.058 0.039 0.029 0.007 0.027 
 (0.047) (0.048) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.048) (0.046) 
App price*time 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Category fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Total observations 12,720 12,720 12,720 12,720 12,720 12,720 12,720 
Total firms 1533 1533 1533 1533 1533 1533 1533 
Total exit events 1,791 1,791 1,791 1,791 1,791 1,791 1,791 
Log likelihood -10,935.71 -10,913.76 -10,927.44 -10,928.48 -10,891.25 -10,908.47 -10,885.81 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3: Robustness checks 
 Model 8 (Top 
250 ranks) 
Model 9   
(2-month) 
Model 10 
(4-month) 
Model 11 
(common firms) 
Model 12 (general 
experience) 
Model 13 (post- 
Jan’12 Top rank) 
Model 14 (post- 
Dec’11 entry) 
Ecosystem complexity -0.493** -0.570*** -0.624*** -0.682*** -0.490** -0.421** -0.709*** 
 (0.208) (0.164) (0.173) (0.209) (0.222) (0.175) (0.257) 
Ecosystem experience -0.032*** -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.021** -0.005 -0.052*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.018) 
Platform transition 0.857** 0.580** 0.801*** 0.722** 0.722** 0.672** 0.995** 
 (0.381) (0.228) (0.268) (0.294) (0.294) (0.269) (0.443) 
Ecosystem complexity*Experience -0.021** -0.016** -0.014* -0.015 -0.016 -0.004 -0.029 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.021) 
Ecosystem Complexity* Transition 0.945** 0.527* 0.728** 0.675* 0.679* 0.636* 0.987* 
 (0.433) (0.278) (0.324) (0.360) (0.360) (0.326) (0.516) 
New apps -0.372* -0.314* -0.310* -0.234 -0.195 0.133 0.011 
 (0.193) (0.162) (0.172) (0.229) (0.227) (0.173) (0.317) 
New firms 0.272 0.260 0.157 0.044 0.022 -0.350* -0.143 
 (0.249) (0.191) (0.208) (0.267) (0.265) (0.199) (0.376) 
Apps in Top 500 0.017** 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 -0.002 0.013 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012) 
(Apps in Top 500)2 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size (employee) -0.006** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.007** -0.024 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.016) 
Other online business -0.129* -0.200*** -0.210*** -0.198** -0.194** -0.138** -0.264*** 
 (0.073) (0.061) (0.065) (0.079) (0.079) (0.063) (0.097) 
Other offline business -0.022 0.141* 0.093 0.127 0.137 0.137* 0.255** 
 (0.083) (0.074) (0.077) (0.085) (0.086) (0.072) (0.128) 
Dual participation -0.215*** -0.333*** -0.392***   -0.293*** -0.176* 
 (0.074) (0.062) (0.065)   (0.064) (0.102) 
Firm app rating -0.041 -0.070 -0.067 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 0.027 
 (0.066) (0.054) (0.057) (0.072) (0.073) (0.053) (0.087) 
Top 500 free app -0.470*** -0.647*** -0.728*** -0.767*** -0.775*** -0.581*** -0.770*** 
 (0.140) (0.096) (0.099) (0.117) (0.117) (0.098) (0.187) 
Top 500 free app*time 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
App price 0.056* 0.049 0.034 -0.063 -0.053 0.095** 0.063 
 (0.034) (0.044) (0.047) (0.058) (0.059) (0.043) (0.073) 
App price*time -0.000* 0.001 0.002 0.007** 0.007* 0.000 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
General experience     -0.008**   
     (0.004)   
Category fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Total observations 6,785 12,720 12,720 10,010 10,010 6,578 3,675 
Total firms 1042 1533 1533 997 997 1325 662 
Total exit events 1,034 2,013 1,658 1,243 1,243 1,442 620 
Log likelihood -5,700.77 -12,265.69 -10,069.45 -7,297.72 -7,294.45 -7,864.84 -3,000.25 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 4: Robustness checks (Alternative complexity measure) 
 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Ecosystem complexity -1.067** -1.066** -1.760** -1.502* 
 (0.511) (0.512) (0.789) (0.818) 
Ecosystem experience -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Platform transition 0.316*** 0.274** 0.002 0.075 
 (0.116) (0.117) (0.181) (0.192) 
Ecosystem complexity*Experience   -0.004 -0.005 
   (0.020) (0.020) 
Ecosystem Complexity* Transition   7.320** 5.026 
   (3.336) (3.906) 
New apps 0.186 0.099 0.104 0.077 
 (0.257) (0.263) (0.263) (0.265) 
New firms -0.289 -0.157 -0.215 -0.157 
 (0.277) (0.290) (0.283) (0.291) 
Apps in Top 500 -0.003 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
(Apps in Top 500)2 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size (employee) -0.010** -0.010** -0.010** -0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Other online business -0.247*** -0.248*** -0.250*** -0.249*** 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) 
Other offline business 0.025 0.028 0.027 0.029 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) 
Dual participation -0.416*** -0.412*** -0.415*** -0.413*** 
 (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) 
Firm app rating -0.158** -0.152* -0.156* -0.153* 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) 
Top 500 free app -0.763*** -0.768*** -0.771*** -0.773*** 
 (0.113) (0.114) (0.115) (0.115) 
Top 500 free app*time 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
App price 0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
App price*time 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
User characteristics     
Female usersa 5.194 3.211 5.409 4.134 
 (3.831) (3.906) (3.819) (3.990) 
Age(18-45)a  4.335 1.231 2.133 0.936 
 (3.015) (3.303) (3.109) (3.298) 
App download (>5 per month)a 5.283* -1.825 4.721* 0.579 
 (2.769) (3.996) (2.735) (4.458) 
iOS  0.356**  0.217 
  (0.179)  (0.211) 
Category Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Total observations 8,742 8,742 8,742 8,742 
Total firms 1099 1099 1099 1099 
Total exit events 1,010 1,010 1,010 1,010 
Log likelihood -6,127.13 -6,125.26 -6,125.03 -6,124.54 
aVariables are in percentage of total subscribers. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
